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LEVERAGING BIAS IN FORENSIC SCIENCE
Roger Koppl∗Φ

A Response to Simon A. Cole, Acculturating
Forensic Science: What Is ‘Scientific Culture’,
and How Can Forensic Science Adopt It?, 38 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 435 (2010).
Dr. Simon Cole calls for a more hierarchical
organization
of
forensic
science
in
his
challenging
Article,
Acculturating
Forensic
Science: What is ‘Scientific Culture’, and How can
Forensic Science Adopt it?1
I think Dr. Cole is
right to say that there are different roles in
forensic science, but somewhat mistaken in his
call for hierarchy.
Dr. Cole points out that the term “forensic
science” covers a variety of activities that may
require rather different skills.
He divides
forensic science into five groups of activities:
(1) basic research, (2) evidence collection, (3)
technical management, (4) analysis, and (5)
interpretation.2
He associates each group of
activities with a different set of epistemic
virtues.
Basic researchers, for example, should
“innovate” and “subject their innovations to
∗
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1. Simon Cole, Acculturating Forensic Science: What is
‘Scientific Culture’, and How Can Forensic Science Adopt It?,
38 FORDHAM U RB . L.J. 435, 468 (2010).
2. Id. at 454-57.
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rigorous scrutiny.”3 By contrast, analysts (bench
examiners) should be “careful, meticulous, and
honest.”4
Dr. Cole calls for “hierarchy” to empower basic
researchers to make decisions that must be obeyed
during the examination and interpretation of
forensic evidence.5
The best available option,
Dr. Cole says, is “a ‘hierarchical’ model in which
a ‘knowledge elite’ of researchers exerts control
over practitioners.”6
Thus, Dr. Cole has not
chosen an inappropriate or misleading term for his
desired outcome.
He really is calling for a
genuine hierarchy that would empower an “elite”
group within the general field. Medicine is the
model. The medical profession has been organized
hierarchically such that an elite of basic
researchers controls the actions of practitioners.
Dr. Cole thinks medicine is a good model in part
because “society is reasonably content with the
hierarchical model in medicine.”7
The bare bones of the argument, then, seem to be
that medicine is working pretty well and it is
hierarchical.
Knowledge cascades down from the
research
elite
to
practicing
physicians.
Similarly, forensic science should ensure that
bench examiners do only what the knowledge elite
allows. This division of intellectual labor will
help to ensure that no bench examiner uses
unreliable and perhaps improvised techniques.
Presumably, some of the “research” in the Kirk
Turner case provides an extreme example of what
Dr. Cole wishes to prevent.8

3. Id. at 457.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 468-69.
6. Id. at 468.
7. Id.
8. See Joseph Neff, Agents’ Secrets: Bloodstain Pattern
Evidence, NEWOBSERVER. COM, http://video.newsobserver.videos.vmix
core.com/vmix_hosted_apps/p/media?id=17182298&item_index=1&ge
nre_id=1153&sort=NULL (last visited Dec. 29, 2011).
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I like much of Dr. Cole’s analysis, including
his emphasis on the division of labor within
forensic science.
But, his call for hierarchy
misses the mark, and he exaggerates both the
degree of hierarchy in medicine and the quality of
medical research. I will take up the example of
medical research first and then discuss hierarchy
in forensic science.
My criticism of Dr. Cole’s
reform proposal does not imply that his analyses
of infirmities in forensic science are equally
flawed. On the contrary, I have learned a great
deal from Dr. Cole and his co-authors, whose work
I admire greatly.
Dr. Cole has done important
work in showing that forensic science, especially
fingerprint analysis, is less reliable and less
grounded in sound research than either its
practitioners or the general public might have
imagined. He has chronicled errors and explained
how the universal cognitive architecture of humans
can lead forensic scientists astray.
But, to
borrow Dr. Cole’s medical analogy, diagnosis and
therapy are not the same. I recognize and admire
Dr. Cole’s diagnostic skills even as I challenge
the wisdom of his therapeutic advice.
I. MEDICINE
A. Who Chose the Current System?
I confess to some perplexity at Dr. Cole’s claim
that “society is reasonably content with the
hierarchical model in medicine.”9 In what sense?
Has “society” somehow surveyed the alternatives
and chosen the current system as the least-worst
option? The current system is not the product of
any rational choice, even though the conflicting
individual choices that led, higgledy-piggledy, to
the current system may have all been perfectly
“rational” in some sense.

9. Cole, supra note 1, at 468.
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The organization of the market for health care,
like the organization of most markets, is a
product of the shifting politics of interest
groups.
Economists are nearly unanimous, for
example, in the view that licensing restrictions
in medicine have served physicians better than
patients,10 and many view the existing restrictions
as mostly a sop to the special interests of the
American Medical Association (AMA).11 As the
economic theory of “public choice” teaches,
elected officials in a representative democracy
have an incentive to concentrate benefits and
disperse costs.12
The contest of interests often
produces a “system” that is not systematic at all.
Understanding
what
the
system
is,
who
is
benefitting, and so on requires more time than
most voters can reasonably invest.
Voters are
“rationally ignorant” about the system, which
makes it easier for the game to continue.
I do
not mean to deny that ideology and high principle
also influence outcomes. I mean only to deny that
the existence of a system implies that voters have
somehow chosen the system or approved it.
B. How Hierarchical Is Medicine?
Dr. Cole identifies a “knowledge elite” in
medicine, consisting of a group of researchers
that “exerts control over practitioners.”13 “These
researchers are engaged in basic research and the
production of knowledge about the natural world.
They may never see patients, never have seen a
patient since medical school . . . or (in the case
of Ph.D.'s) never have seen a patient at all.”14
Below this group of “biomedical researchers” are
10. See Shirley Svorny, Licensing Doctors: Do Economists
Agree?, 1 E CON J. WATCH 219, 285-89 (2004) (citations omitted).
11. See id.
12. See 3 JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON T ULLOCK, T HE C ALCULUS OF C ONSENT:
LOGICAL F OUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL D EMOCRACY (1962), reprinted in
THE C OLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES M. B UCHANAN 146-48 (1999).
13. Cole, supra note 1, at 468.
14. Id. at 464.
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the “clinical physicians.”15
Members of this
second group “need not . . . perform research
themselves or even be competent to perform
research.”16 Dr. Cole does not indicate how much
of an overlap might exist between these two
groups. But the supposed gold standard in medical
research,
the
double-blind
clinical
trial,
requires
working
with
real
human
patients.
Moreover, clinical practice does give rise to
contributions
to
the
literature
in
medical
science. THE LANCET regularly runs articles under
the heading “case report.” A recent issue (15-21
October 2011) has a “case report” on the diagnosis
of a cervical lump in a forty-four year-old
Moroccan man.17
It draws general inferences,
including the importance of considering the
geographical origins of patients.18 The same issue
of THE LANCET has several “cohort studies,” in
which a group receives medical treatment (or
shares some condition) and long-term outcomes are
chronicled.
Picking one at random, I find that
two of the co-authors performed surgery on 90% of
the cohort.19
Thus, medical practice and medical
research are more mingled than Dr. Cole seems to
suggest.
Although practice and “discovery science” may be
more mixed than Dr. Cole suggests, some writers
lament the gap between them. Persell et al., for
example,
note
that
patients
may
present
combinations of conditions not represented in the
research of the randomized controlled studies of
medicine’s “knowledge elite.”20 In their study of
15. Id. at 464-65.
16. Id.
17. See Alexander D. Coronet et al., Cervical Lump? The Clue
Is in the Hotspot, 378 L ANCET 1438, 1438 (2011).
18. See id.
19. See Jane de Tsi et al., The Long-Term Outcome of Adult
Epilepsy Surgery, Patterns of Seizure Remission, and Relapse:
A Cohort Study, 378 L ANCET 1388, 1388 (2011).
20. See Stephen D. Persell, M.D., et al., Frequency of
Inappropriate Medical Exceptions to Quality Measures, 152
ANNALS I NTERNAL MED. 225, 228 (2010) (“[P]ractice guidelines have
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clinicians, Persell et al. found that deviation
from “guideline-recommended care” was “valid most
of the time.”21 Tonelli draws the inference from
this study and others that “[t]here is no
hierarchy of medical knowledge or medical evidence
for clinical practice.”22
Tonelli exemplifies a
literature that resists the very hierarchy of
evidence-based medicine that Dr. Cole celebrates.
I do not know whether the critics of evidencebased
medicine
exaggerate
the
talents
of
clinicians.
Two inferences from this literature
seem reasonably safe, however.
First, the
hierarchical model of medicine does not enjoy
universal acclaim or even acceptance.
Second,
medical practitioners can and do exercise judgment
in applying the protocols and guidelines handed
down from the knowledge elite of medicine. This
role of judgment in medicine may be good or bad.
It may or may not be desirable that bench
examiners in crime labs exercise a similar
judgment.
In any event, however, medicine does
not seem to be as good a model for Dr. Cole’s
desired system as he seems to suggest.
C. How Good Is Medical Research?
Whether or not “society is reasonably content
with the hierarchical model in medicine,”23 we may
ask whether society should be.
Is medical
research in this country (and elsewhere) all that
good? Unfortunately, medical research is probably
not as good as we might have imagined.

been criticized because the[ir] recommendations may be
inappropriate for individual patients or because they may
create
undue
burden
for
patients
with
many
medical
problems.”).
21. Id.
22. Mark R. Tonelli, Integrating Clinical Research into
Clinical Decision Making, 47 ANN. I ST. S UPER. SANITÀ 26, 29
(2011) (It.).
23. Cole, supra note 1, at 468 (emphasis added).
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Douglas A. Altman says “[t]here is considerable
evidence that many published reports of randomized
controlled trials (RCTs) are poor or even wrong,
despite their clear importance.”24 He lists seven
widespread problems including “[n]ot reporting an
adequate method for generating random numbers” and
“[i]nadequate information on harmful consequences
of interventions.”25
Berger, Matthews, & Grosch
give
three
examples
in
which
experimental
precautions
against
observer
effects
are
compromised
by
“inappropriate
yet
regimented
research methods.”26 In the most striking of the
three examples, “run-in bias” is created by
deleting adverse events prior to randomization.27
“In randomized treatment trials,” they explain,
“it is common to pre-treat the patients with the
active treatment, evaluate their outcomes, and
determine which patients to randomize based upon
those outcomes. Bad outcomes (even deaths) prior
to randomization do not make it into the analysis
and do not count against the active treatment
under scrutiny.”28
John P.A. Ioannidis explains why “most current
published research findings are false.”29
I have
reviewed his argument more carefully elsewhere.30
The essence of his finding, however, is fairly
straightforward.
If
many
researchers
are
confident that, for example, sunspots cause

24. Douglas C. Altman, Poor Quality Medical Research: What
Can Journals Do?, 287 JAMA 2765, 2765 (2002) (citations
omitted).
25. Id. at 2766.
26. Vance
W.
Berger
et
al.,
On
Improving
Research
Methodology in Clinical Trials, 17 S TAT. METHODS M ED. R ES . 231,
231 (2008).
27. Id. at 234-35.
28. Id. at 234.
29. John P.A. Ioannidis, Why most Published Research
Findings Are False, 2 PLOS M ED. 0696, 0696 (2005), available
at http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2
Fjournal.pmed.0020124.
30. See Roger Koppl, The Social Construction of Expertise,
47 SOC’ Y 220, 222 (2010).
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baldness, there will be many studies examining
this relationship. The few studies that generate
a positive result by chance will be published.
Sincere and honest researchers who get negative
results may innocently cast about for reasons to
doubt their own findings. Rather than attempting
to publish the negative result, they search the
space of regression equations, adding and dropping
regressors, discarding “outliers,” and so forth.
If the search chances upon the “right” combination
to generate a positive result, the researcher will
be rewarded with a well-cited publication that
strengthens the growing evidence for a link
between sunspots and baldness.
“The probability
that at least one study, among several done on the
same question, claims a statistically significant
research finding,” grows as the number of such
studies grows.31
Ioannidis says that “[t]he
greater the number . . . of tested relationships
in a scientific field, the less likely the
research findings are to be true.”32 And, “[t]he
greater the flexibility in designs, definitions,
outcomes, and analytical modes in a scientific
field, the less likely the research findings are
to be true.”33
The
poor
quality
of
medical
research
is
reflected in the regular reversal of past results.
Recently, for example, a well-publicized study has
overturned the previous wisdom that vitamin E
reduces the risk of prostate cancer in men.34
D. What About Outcomes?
The infirmities of biomedical research might
matter less if patient outcomes were better.

31.
32.
33.
34.

See Ioannidis, supra note 29, at 0697.
Id. at 0698.
Id.
See Vitamin E No Panacea for Prostate Cancer, S. DIEGO
UNION T RIB., Oct. 18, 2011, available at http://www.signon
sandiego.com/news/2011/oct/18/vitamin-e-no-panacea-for-prost
ate-cancer/?page=1#article.
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Unfortunately, the evidence suggests that modern
medicine
has
relatively
modest
benefits
in
supporting patient outcomes.
Adverse events are relatively common.
Brennan
et al. found that at least 3.2% of hospital
admissions in the U.S. result in errors that
either prolong admission or produce a disability
at the time of discharge.35 Andrews et al. found a
much higher rate of 17.7%.36 One study found the
rate of adverse drug events during hospitalization
to be 4.2%.37 A more recent study found a rate of
at least 8%.38 Adverse events are rather serious
and were measured only in the hospital in the
studies I have cited. Presumably, other cases of
poor outcomes from medical practice occur in
relatively high rates as well.
Hanson reviews evidence that medical care and
expenses are not strongly correlated with health
outcomes.39 The Rand study seems to have been the
only
randomized
controlled
study
of
the
relationship between healthcare expenditures and
healthcare outcomes.40 The study randomly assigned

35. See Troyen A. Brennan et al., Incidence of Adverse
Events and Negligence in Hospitalized Patients: Results of
the Harvard Medical Practice Study I, 324 NEW E NG . J. MED. 370,
370 (1991).
36. See Lori B. Andrews et al., An Alternative Strategy for
Studying Adverse Events in Medical Care, 349 L ANCET 309, 309
(1997).
37. See Bonnie L. Senst et al., Practical Approach to
Determining Costs and Frequency of Adverse Drug Events in a
Health Care Network, 58 A M. J. H EALTH-SYS. P HARMACY 1126, 1129
(2001).
38. See Mark L. Metersky et al., Racial Disparities in the
Frequency of Patient Safety Events: Results from the National
Medicare Patient Safety Monitoring System, 49 MED. CARE 504,
508 tbl. 3 (2011).
39. See Robin D. Hanson, Showing That You Care: The
Evolution of Health Altruism, 70 M ED . HYPOTHESES 725, 728-30
(2008).
40. ROBERT H. BROOK ET AL., RAND CORP., T HE EFFECT OF C OINSURANCE ON THE
HEALTH OF A DULTS : RESULTS FROM THE R AND H EALTH I NSURANCE E XPERIMENT 1
(1984), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/2006
/R3055.pdf.
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2,005 families to one of several insurance plans.41
Some plans were more generous than others, and one
plan offered free care.42 The study showed little
to no benefit of free care besides lower blood
pressure and getting corrective lenses to improve
“far vision.”43
The beneficial effect for both
measures was low.44
The other studies Hanson
reviewed came to qualitatively similar results.
Hanson says: “An optimistic accounting of the
benefits of specific treatments attributes only
five years of the 40 or more years of added
lifespan
over
the
last
two
centuries
to
medicine.”45
These studies may underestimate the
importance of modern medicine in, for example,
reducing the risks of childbirth.
Even here,
however, there is some ambiguity about the
relative importance of medical innovations such as
forceps and non-medical factors such as improved
diet.46 Overall, the evidence seems to support the
view that Dr. Cole should be more skeptical about
the relationship between medicine and health.
Neither the general public nor anyone in
particular chose the American medical system.
Medical research is less hierarchical than Dr.
Cole seems to suggest.
The hierarchy that does
exist seems to have created a gap between the
findings of the research elite and the clinical
needs of practitioners and their patients.
The
quality of research by the elite seems to be well
below the standard Dr. Cole likely desires.
And
modern medical practice may have much less to do
with health outcomes than Dr. Cole seems to
implicitly assume.
Overall, then, medicine may
41. See id. at 3-4.
42. See id.
43. Id. at 18-19.
44. See id.
45. Hanson, supra note 39, at 729 (citing John P. Bunker et
al., Improving Health: Measuring Effects of Medical Care, 72
MILBANK Q. 225, 237-38 (1994)).
46. See Johanson
et
al.,
Has
the
Medicalisation
of
Childbirth Gone Too Far?, 324 B RIT. M ED . J. 892, 892 (2002).
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not represent an ideal for forensic science to
emulate.
II. FORENSIC SCIENCE
It is not a coincidence that the actually
existing hierarchy in medicine turns out, upon
examination, to be less attractive than Dr. Cole
seems to believe. I think Dr. Cole errs in trying
to set up a system in which knowledge cascades
downward from an elite. I will risk caricaturing
Dr. Cole’s position by characterizing it in plain
terms.
Dr. Cole recognizes that bench examiners
may be led astray by cognitive bias.
Bench
examiners’ lack of rigorous scientific training
compounds the problem when they invent techniques
ad hoc, deviate from protocol, or otherwise exceed
their competence.47
Dr. Cole wishes to fix the
problem by creating an elite that will remove the
exercise of discretion from the lower levels of
the hierarchy.48
Stripped of their discretion,
bench examiners will not be able to unconsciously
skew results in accordance with the bench
examiners’ cognitive biases.
Unfortunately, Dr.
Cole does not consider who will capture this
hypothetical
National
Institute
of
Forensic
49
Science (NIFS).
Nor does he recognize that the
lower levels of the hierarchy, especially that of
“technical management,” will have to exercise
discretion,
the
knowledge
hierarchy
47. See Cole, supra note 1, at 459 (citation omitted)
(“[T]hey are often not trained to do basic research, lack the
resources typically available to researchers at university,
industrial,
and
government
laboratories,
and
lack
the
professional networks basic researchers use to test their
research and generate innovation.”).
48. See id. at 468-69 (“Researchers would have the last word
on whether a method or technique is valid. Technicians would
no longer be put in the awkward position of having to defend
the validity of the techniques they apply.”).
49. The proposal for an NIFS was made in N AT ’L RES. C OUNCIL,
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC S CIENCE IN THE U NITED S TATES: A PATH F ORWARD 19
(2009),
available
at
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/
printers/111th/111-28_49681.PDF.
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notwithstanding. Finally, Dr. Cole does not seem
to have considered the possibility of creating a
system of checks and balances in which one bias
checks another.
A. Who Will Capture NIFS?
Dr. Cole says, “In proposing hierarchy, it
should be noted that we are not proposing the
creation of an elite ‘priesthood’ that would have
a monopoly on the legitimation of knowledge.”50 He
elaborates, “Basic Researchers would be expected
to be a diverse group of scientists with diverse
viewpoints, as medical researchers are today.”51
And he compares NIFS to the National Institutes of
Health or the Food and Drug Administration.52 As
Ioannidis and others suggest, the viewpoints of
medical researchers are not particularly diverse;
research fashions come and go.53
It matters, I think, just what role NIFS would
play and just who would be acting in that role.
Presumably, NIFS would be the main source of
funding for research in forensic science. If so,
it is important to look into the incentives of
NIFS
officials.
Dr.
Cole
wants
“diverse
54
viewpoints,” but will NIFS deliver? The results
of NIFS-sponsored research would vary depending on
who
reviews
grant
proposals.
Imagine two
scenarios.
First, imagine scientists, who agree
with Budowle et al. that “[a] community-wide error
rate is not meaningful,”55 dominate NIFS review
panels.
Now imagine that scientists who agree
with Dr. Cole dominate NIFS review panels.
In
50. Cole, supra note 1, at 469 (citation omitted).
51. Id.
52. See id.
53. See Ioannidis¸ supra note 29, at 0700.
54. See Cole, supra note 1, at 469 (“Basic Researchers would
be expected to be a diverse group of scientists with diverse
viewpoints, as medical researchers are today.”).
55. Bruce Budowle et al., A Perspective on Errors, Bias, and
Interpretation in Forensic Sciences and Direction for
Continuing Advancement, 54 J. FORENSIC SCI. 798, 801 (2009).

2012]

LEVERAGING BIAS IN FORENSIC SCIENCE

49

which scenario is research more likely to estimate
error rates in forensic science? The Dr. Budowle
group and the Dr. Cole group would earnestly
strive to uphold the highest scientific standards.
Given
their
prior
views,
however,
the
two
different groups will assess competing research
proposals differently and the results of the
process will differ radically. Dr. Cole is right
to extol “diverse viewpoints,” but it might be
hard for a homogeneous group, be they Dr. Budowle
disciples or Dr. Cole disciples, to avoid skewing
research awards toward scholars and scientists who
seem to be leaning in the same direction.
I
appreciate Dr. Cole’s aversion to “an elite
‘priesthood’ that would have a monopoly on the
legitimation
of
knowledge,”56
but
the
very
existence of NIFS would seem to create a
substantial risk of creating such a priesthood.
In part, I am raising the problem of regulatory
capture. Dr. Cole recognizes that “[i]f [NIFS] is
‘captured’ by law enforcement, it becomes less
obvious that it would be a force for improvement
rather than stagnation.”57 He does not offer any
suggestions, however, for avoiding this result.
Regulatory and oversight bodies are supposed to
constrain special interests and protect the
general interest.
When regulatory and oversight
bodies instead serve special interests, these
bodies have been “captured.”
An industry must
offer something in return if it is to capture a
regulator.
The reciprocation may consist of
campaign contributions to members of Congress who
provide oversight of the regulatory body. It may
take any of an indefinitely large number of other
forms. Capture is the norm, unfortunately, which
makes beneficial change hard.
The first great
regulatory body in the U.S. was the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC), which was established
in 1887 to control railroads.
The Interstate
56. Cole, supra note 1, at 469 (citation omitted).
57. Id. at 436.
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Commerce Act prohibited price discrimination and
required that “all charges . . . shall be
reasonable and just.”58
This language seems to
constrain the railroads, and yet the railroads
supported the Act.59
Posner explains: “The
railroads supported the enactment of the first
Interstate Commerce Act, which was designed to
prevent
railroads
from
practicing
price
discrimination,
because
discrimination
was
undermining the railroads’ cartels.”60
The interest that captures a regulator may not
be the regulated industry. “Crudely put, the
butter producers wish to suppress margarine and
encourage the production of bread.”61 For example,
the railroads sometimes used state regulators to
suppress trucking.62
In the 1930s, “Texas and
Louisiana placed a 7000-pound payload limit on
trucks serving (and hence competing with) two or
more railroad stations, and a 14,000-pound limit
on trucks serving only one station (hence, not
competing with it).”63
The theory of supply and demand predicts that a
commodity sold on a competitive market will end up
in the hands of those who value it most, as
measured by willingness to pay.
The theory does
not tell us, however, who is willing to pay the
most. Similarly, the theory of regulatory capture
does not tell us who will win in the contest of
interests to capture a regulator.
It is a
continuous fight; victory may be partial and
fleeting.
Nevertheless,
we
can
say
that
concentrated
interests
aid
victory.
Well-

58. Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, § 1, 24 Stat. 379, 379
(1887) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49
U.S.C.).
59. See Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation,
5 BELL J. E CON. & MGMT. SCI. 335, 337 (1974).
60. See id.
61. George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 B ELL
J. E CON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 6 (1971).
62. See id. at 8.
63. Id.
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organized
groups
with
relatively
large
and
homogeneous interests have an advantage in the
contest. Considering who fits that bill for NIFS,
the answer may be law enforcement. According to
Bureau of Labor Statistics data, in 2008 the
number of police and detectives, corrections
officers and jailers, first-line supervisors and
managers of corrections officers, bailiffs, and
probation officers was 1,505,200.64
These people
are part of a relatively large, concentrated,
well-organized, and homogeneous interest group.
Is there any other interest group, such as the
innocence movement,65 in a good position to compete
with law enforcement? And if so, for how long?
B. Hierarchy Does Not Eliminate Discretion
Dr. Cole’s appeal to hierarchy may have another
limit. As in medicine, there is a gap between the
needs of practitioners and the general results
produced by the knowledge elite. In medicine, the
patient may have unique or unusual combinations of
characteristics, such as concurrent diseases. In
forensic science, the evidence may have unique or
unusual combinations of characteristics, such as
material substrates. Thus, validation studies in
fingerprint analysis may not help the bench
examiner to evaluate a latent print deposited on
wood grain or a pebbled lampshade. The advocates
of sequential unmasking recognized the importance
of case specific judgment by separating the task
of
a
case
manager
(a
part
of
“technical
64. There were approximately 883,600 employed police and
detectives in 2008. See B UREAU OF L ABOR STATISTICS, O CCUPATIONAL
OUTLOOK HANDBOOK 2010-11 E DITION, B ULLETIN 2800, 476 (2010),
available at http://www.bls.gov/oco/oco2008.htm.
454,500
were employed as jailers or correctional officers; 43,500 as
first-line supervisors and managers thereof; and 20,200 as
bailiffs in 2008. See id. at 469.
And, there were 103,400
employed
probation
officers
and
correctional
treatment
officers in 2008. See id. at 243. The sum of these numbers
is 1,505,200.
65. See, e.g., I NNOCENCE P ROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject
.org (last visited Nov. 2, 2011).
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management,” presumably) from that of a bench
examiner.66 Context information is not hidden from
the case manager who determines what potentially
biasing information is revealed to the bench
examiner in what sequence.67
This separation of
tasks may reduce the element of discretion in the
work of bench examiners, though it will probably
not eliminate it.
To
effect
sequential
unmasking
and
the
separation of tasks between the case manager and
the bench examiner requires the exercise of
discretion by the case manager, whose job cannot
be reduced to a routine. I do not understand how
increased hierarchy can solve the problems in
forensic science when a crucial worker in the
system, the case manager operating well below the
level of Basic Research, must use judgment and
discretion in her daily work.
Recall that Dr.
Cole favors “a ‘hierarchical’ model in which a
‘knowledge elite’ of researchers exerts control
over practitioners.”68 But to exert control means
to pre-decide, and thus, to eliminate judgment and
discretion, and the infinite variety of case
particulars prevents the elite from making all
decisions in advance.
It therefore prevents the
elite from exercising effective control over
practitioners.

66. See Dan E. Krane et al., Letter to the Editor:
Sequential Unmasking: A Means of Minimizing Observer Effects
in Forensic DNA Interpretation, 53 J. F ORENSIC S CI . 1006, 1006
(2008), available at http://www.bioforensics.com/sequential_
unmasking/ (“A simple protocol would dictate a separation of
tasks between a qualified individual familiar with case
information (a case manager) and an analyst from whom domainirrelevant information is masked.”).
67. See id.; D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho
Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden
Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 C ALIF. L. REV. 1,
35-38 (2002).
68. Cole, supra note 1, at 468.
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C. Why Not Leverage Bias?
Dr. Cole does not discuss the possibility of
leveraging bias to achieve more satisfactory
results by strengthening the defense right to
expertise.69 A defense right to forensic expertise
is the single best way to reduce the incidence of
false and misleading forensic science testimony.
E. James Cowan and I explain why competition
between “strongly opposed” experts tends to
improve the quality of information they provide to
third parties such as juries.70 “If the interests
of
the
competing
information
suppliers
are
strongly opposed then one of them always has an
incentive to provide additional information.”71 If
some bit of relevant information has not been
revealed, then, by virtue of the fact that it is
relevant, it will help one side or the other.
Accordingly, one side or the other will have an
incentive to reveal it.72 This logic works even if
both sides are biased.
It requires only that
their interests in the case be strongly opposed.
Thus, the adversarial system of Anglo-American
jurisprudence allows for pitting one bias against
another to produce results that more closely
resemble the consequences of unbiased analysis.
Although it is important to attempt to reduce bias
by measures such as sequential unmasking, all such
measures are incomplete.
The remaining biases

69. See Paul C. Giannelli, Ake v. Oklahoma: The Right to
Expert Assistance in a Post-Daubert, Post-DNA World, 89 C ORNELL
L. REV. 1305, 1358 (2004) (“Under a Sixth Amendment theory, an
expert should be appointed whenever necessary for counsel to
render effective assistance ‘whenever the [expert] services
are necessary to the preparation and presentation of an
adequate defense.’”) (footnote omitted) (internal quotations
omitted).
70. See Roger Koppl & E. James Cowan, A Battle of Forensic
Experts Is Not a Race to the Bottom, 22 REV . POL. E CON. 235,
253 (2010) (citing Milgrom & Roberts, Relying on the
Information of Interested Parties, 17 RAND J. ECON. 18, 25, 26
(1986)).
71. Id.
72. See id.
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should also be leveraged by pitting one expert
against the other. We need checks and balances.
The existence of defense experts in forensic
science
would
also
create
a
self-renewing
foundation for continuous improvement in forensic
science. Many reforms do not stick. A new reform
is generally effective only when it is first
applied, and perhaps not even then. If the reform
works initially, it is because the affected
parties have no coping strategies.
Over time,
however, those affected parties learn compensating
strategies and the reform loses its beneficial
effects. The reform does not stick. For example,
affected parties may capture an oversight body. A
body of scientific experts similar to public
defenders and allied with them would, however, act
to preserve its own existence in much the way that
public defenders are unlikely to be subverted from
their adversarial role. The reform creating such
a group is, therefore, a self-sticking reform.
The reform creates an organized body of persons
with a direct interest in maintaining the reform.
Once this reform is in place, each criminal case
will have two forensic experts with strongly
opposed interests.
Each side will have an
incentive to document the upstream deficiencies of
the system and bring them to the attention of the
court whenever that is strategically appropriate.
In this way, competing forensic experts become the
central self-regulatory element of the system.
Such a reform would be truly transformative of the
criminal justice system in America.
In an earlier article, I have suggested a suite
of reforms that would make forensic science a
self-governing system that reduces bias through
measures such as sequential unmasking, but also
leverages
biases
through
competing
experts.73
Redundancy
is
an
essential
feature
of
my

73. See generally Roger Koppl, How to
Science, 20 EUR. J. L. & ECON. 255 (2005).
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proposal.74 Unfortunately, I cannot expand on the
important principle of redundancy in this already
lengthy Response.
III. TWO PATHS FORWARD
The subtitle of the 2009 National Academy of
Sciences (NAS) report was A PATH FORWARD. 75
In
recommending oversight through NIFS the report did
reveal a path forward.
It revealed the path of
oversight, command, and control.76 But there is a
second path neglected by both the authors of the
NAS report and Dr. Cole.
That is the path of
checks and balances, the path that leverages the
biases and infirmities of the real human actors in
the system to generate results that are better
than the results any one person could have
produced.
Discovery science is such a system.
Discovery
science advances by the rivalry of theories,
schools, and individual personalities.
Every
physicist since Galileo and before has had his or
her personal limits, quirks, and intellectual
prejudices. And yet the corpus of physical theory
is one of the greatest achievements of the human
intellect. The system is better than any of its
parts. The forensic science community should seek
out ways to make the social structure of forensic
science more nearly resemble the social structure
of discovery science, rather than the questionable
social structure of medicine. Command and control
systems of the sort Dr. Cole recommends are
vulnerable to take-over by elites that may
represent narrow interests or simply lack the
talents required to make the system work well. No
matter who runs the show, command and control
systems cannot be better than the elites that
control those systems, and may be a good deal

74. See id. at 467-69.
75. NAT ’L R ES. C OUNCIL, supra note 49.
76. See id. at 78-79.
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worse.
We should think more about the path not
taken by the NAS.

